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TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE CLAUSE IN AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE
The ordinary automobile liability insurance policy contains a
provision extending insurance protection to the operation of an automobile temporarily substituted for the described automobile. This
provision has given rise to litigation to determine its construction.
In the recent Minnesota case of Gabrelcik v. National Indem. Co.,'
the insured, owner of a one-automobile taxicab business, substituted
an automobile for her disabled vehicle. While the substitute automobile was being used as a taxicab, an accident occurred which resulted
in personal injury to a passenger.2 An employee was driving at the
time of the accident. 3 The substitute automobile was owned by
the insured's husband's used-car business. The insured brought this
declaratory judgment action against the insurer to determine whether
the temporary substitute provision of the insured's policy afforded
protection during her operation of this particular temporary substitute automobile.4 Under the temporary substitute automobile provision, the policy provided coverage to the insured for the operation of
"an automobile not owned by the named insured or his spouse
if a resident of the same household, while temporarily used as
a substitute for the described automobile when withdrawn
N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1964).
9Donna Sarazin was the passenger in the taxicab. For reasons not apparent
from the record, she and her husband were joined as defendants but they filed
no responsive pleading seeking affirmative relief. At the time the principal case
was decided, they had instituted an action against the insured, but a decision
had not been rendered.
3The driver of the taxicab at the time of the accident was Harold Carlson, who
was regularly employed by the insured as a driver. Brief for Respondent, p. 3, Gabrelcik v. National Idem. Co., 131 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. 1964).
'As a condition to obtaining a municipal license to operate a vehicle for hire,
the insured had filed a copy of the policy with the city. It has been held in some
states that a statute requiring that a copy of an insurance policy be filed as a
condition to obtaining a permit to operate a vehicle for hire strikes down any provision in the policy limiting coverage to the operation of the described vehicle and
a substitute therefor and extends policy coverage when any vehicle is operated
under the permit. E.g., Employers Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 238 Ala. 26, 189 So. 58
(1939); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Jacks, 231 Ala. 394, 165 So. 242 (1936); American Fid.
& Cas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 258 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1953); Hipp v. Prudential
Cas. & Sur. Co., 6o S.D. 300, 244 N.W. 346 (1932); Johnson Transfer & Freight
Lines v. American Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 168 Tenn. 514, 79 S.W.2d 587 (1935). The
court in the Gabrelcik case did not reach this result, but indicated, by dicta, that
they might have so held if the suit had been brought by the injured passenger
rather than by the insured. Gabrelcik v. National Indem. Co., supra note i, at 536.
'131

1965]

CASE COMMENTS

279

from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing,
loss or destruction.";
In finding for the insured, the trial court held the husband's
used-car business was a separate legal entity and that the ownership
of the substitute vehicle by the business did not come within the
meaning of the provision excluding coverage when a substitute vehide is owned by the spouse of the named insured. In rejecting the
plaintiff's contention that borrowing the vehicle represented a commercial transaction between the husband as a used-car dealer and the
wife as the operator of a taxicab business, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in a four-three decision, reversed.0 The court held that coverage was not afforded by the policy because the substitute automobile
was owned by the husband, even though registered in the name of
his business, and thus was specifically excluded by the temporary
substitute provision.
In construing the temporary substitute provision, courts generally
look to its purpose, which is for the benefit of the insured.7 Courts also
recognize that necessity requires that certain limitations be imposed
to provide a degree of definiteness as to qualifying automobiles and to
enable the insurer to establish premiums which are not prohibitive.8
The temporary substitute provision has given rise to five general
problems: (1)Who is entitled to make a substitution? (2) What is
"temporary"? (3) what is "substitution"? (4)What is meant by
"Withdrawn from normal use due to breakdown, servicing, repair, loss,
or destruction"? (5)What is meant by "not owned by the named
insured"?
(i) Who is entitled to make a substitution? The temporary substitute provision does not expressly state who may make a temporary
substitution for the described automobile. The leading case of Harte
v. Peerless Ins. Co.,9 held that a substitution can be made only by the
named insured or someone he has authorized. 10 The court said:
Gabrelcik v. National Indem. Co., supra note i,at 535.
GThe majority found the temporary substitute provision to be unambiguous, requiring no construction. The minority found the provision ambiguous in that the
insurer issued a policy, designed to cover an individual family situation, to cover
a commercial risk. After noting the ambiguity, the minority construed the policy
liberally, in favor of the insured.
7Lloyds America v. Ferguson, 116 F.2d 920 (sth Cir. 1941); Central Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Sisneros, 173 F. Supp. 757 (D.N.,M. 1959); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 155
Cal. App. 2d 755, 320 P.2d 90 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
"Ibid.
°123 Vt. 120, 183 A.2d 223 (1962).
"The same result was reached in the only other cases which have considered this
point. Grundeen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 238 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1956);
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"The provision [temporary substitute] is not to be unreasonably
extended to materially increase the risk contemplated by the
insured. Neither is it to be narrowly applied against the insured
for the clause was designed for his protection." '"
Courts agree as to who may make a substitution, but there is a
split between the only two cases considering the question of whether
the permission of the owner of the substitute vehicle is required when
12
a substitution is made. In Davidson v. Fireman'sFund Indem. Co.,
the court held the permission of the owner of the substitute is necessary when a substitution is made by either the named insured or one
acting with his permission. The opposite result was reached in the
recent case of Densmore v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.13 There the
named insured's automobile had been destroyed in an accident. He
stole an automobile and had an accident while driving it. The court
held the stolen car was a temporary substitute because the requirement of the provision is that the substitute automobile not be owned
by the named insured, and if it was stolen, it was not owned by him.
(2) What is "temporary"? The temporary substitute provision expressly shows the intent of the insurer to cover only automobiles
which are temporarily substituted for the described vehicle. "Temporary" is defined as "that which is to last for a limited time only,
as distinguished from that which is perpetual, or indefinite, in its
duration."'14 Courts generally adhere to this definition, and they indicate that "temporary" is an antonym of, or in contradistinction to,
permanent.' 5
Davidson v. Fireman's Fund Indem. Co., 5 N.Y.-d 838, 155 N.E.2d 405, 181 N.Y.S.2d
510 (1958). The reasoning in these cases is not clear, but appears to be that the
courts believe the provision was for the protection of the insured and did not want
to extend it to parties operating without the insured's authority.
1
" Harte v. Peerless Ins. Co., supra note 9, at 226.
1'5 N.Y.2d 838, 155 N.E.2d 405, 181 N.Y.S.2d 51o (1958).

"221 F. Supp. 652 (WD. Pa. 1963).
ISBlack Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
' 5De Marco v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 153 So. 2d 594 (La. 1963) (A car was
left at the insured's home when the owner entered the service. The insured used
it occasionally while the owner was away. While driving the automobile because
his was inoperative, the insured had an accident. The court held the car to be
a "temporary" substitute.) Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La. 1962) (For
more than a year the insured occasionally used a lady friend's automobile even
though his was not withdrawn from use. The insured's automobile was actually
withdrawn from use when he had an accident while driving the lady friend's
automobile. The court found it to be a "temporary" substitute.) Fleckenstein v.
Citizens' Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 591, 40 N.V.2d 733 (1950) (Insured's son left
his automobile at home when he went into the army. The insured used it for several
weeks because the described vehicle was being repaired. The court said the insured use of the son's automobile was not permanent, so it must have been tem-

CASE COMMENTS
16
American Employers' Insurance Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., clearly indicates the word "temporary" does not designate a fixed period
of time. The insured bought the described automobile in August,
195o. The automobile was not in running condition, and it was placed
in a garage for repairs. The insured occasionally used a borrowed automobile during this time. The insured's automobile was still being
repaired on June 4, 1951, when he had an accident while driving the
borrowed automobile. The insurer refused coverage, claiming the
borrowed automobile was no longer a "temporary" substitute. The
court held that the substitution was not permanent, so it must have
been temporary, and thus coverage existed.

(3) What is "substitution"? The rule is that a temporary substitute automobile must actually be used for the same purpose as,' 7 and
in a reasonably similar manner to,' 8 the described automobile. Coverage under the provision, therefore, has been held not to include: a
son's automobile while the son is driving his father, the insured, to
work because the father's automobile would not start;' 9 a brother's
automobile used to run an errand for his insured brother whose automobile was under repair; 20 or an automobile being driven on a fortymile trip as an alleged substitute for a truck whose use, due to its deteriorated condition, was limited to a particular highway construction
2
project. '
Apparently, the substitute vehicle must be similar in type to the
one for which it is substituted. This is the conclusion to be drawn
from the case of Mittelsteadt v. Bovee,2-2 where it was held that a
two-cylinder motorcycle, borrowed by the insured while his automobile was being repaired, was not a temporary substitute "automobile."
(4)What is meant by "withdrawn from normal use due to breakporary.) Hunnicutt. v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 515, 122 S.E.2d 74 (1961) (The
insured and his mother traded automobiles. The insured occasionally used the
automobile he formerly owned. When he had an accident, he was driving his
mother's automobile because his was being repaired. The court found the mother's
automobile to be a "temporary" substitute.)
"-18 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1954) .
"'Little v. Safeguard Ins. Co., 137 So. 2d 415 (La. 1962).
"lVestern Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Norman, 197 F.2d 67 (sth Cir. 1952).
"Southern v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 234 F. Supp. 876 (W.D. Va. 1964) (The
son's automobile was not actually being used in place of the father's described
automobile. The court stated that the son's automobile would have been a temporary substitute if the father had been driving it under the same circumstances.)
"Tanner v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 226
F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1955) (brother's automobile was not actually used in place of
the described automobile).
"Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Norman, supra note 17.
9-'q
Wis. 2d 44, 10D N.W.2d 376 (1960).
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down, servicing, repair, loss, or destruction"? Although the courts
agree that the described automobile must be withdrawn from "normal
use" to qualify for coverage under the temporary substitute provision,23 there is a division in the cases as to what constitutes "normal
use." The decisions of a federal court applying New York law, 24 and
of the courts of California, 25 Oklahoma,2 6 and Tennessee, 27 indicate
that "normal use" does not mean "all normal use." The courts reason
that since the provision does not contain the word "all," it would
not be proper for them to read the provision as if the word were included. 28 The federal court also stated that to require the described
automobile to be withdrawn from "all normal use" would be unreasonable. 29 The courts of Louisiana, 30 Michigan, 31 and Texas, 32 however, have held that the described automobile must be withdrawn
2Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 196 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.
Ky. 1961) (The insured drove his new Buick to his father's home and borrowed
his father's truck to pay a social call which required driving over rough roads.
The court held that the Buick was not withdrawn from normal use.) State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 192 Tenn. 558, 241 S.W.2d 568 (1951) (The insured
borrowed a substitute vehicle which was more suitable for a particular purpose
and in better repair than his. The court held that coverage was not extended
because the described vehicle was not withdrawn from normal use.)
- tAllstate Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 326 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1964) (Insured
had an accident while driving a borrowed automobile. Her car had been driven
to and from a repair gararge the day of the accident. The court held coverage was
extended.)
*Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 156 Cal. App. 2d 755, 320 P.2d 90 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958) (Insured's automobile was not running properly so he borrowed another.
Coverage was extended even though insured's automobile was not withdrawn from
all normal use.)
2Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. West, 351 P.2d 398 (Okla. 1959) (Insured borrowed
his father's automobile for a trip and left the described automobile, which was
in an unsafe condition, with the father to use if he needed it.)
"Canal Ins. Co. v. Paul, 51 Tenn. App. 446, 369 S.W.2d 393 (1962) (The
described automobile was left with the owner of the substitute in case he needed
the use of it.)
2'Supra notes 23-26.
'OAllstate Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra note 23.
1Fullilove v. U.S. Cas. Co., 240 La. 859, 125 So. 2d 389 (1961) (Insured borrowed an automobile to use in place of his for a long trip. His automobile had
badly worn tires but was used on the day of the accident by his wife to go to and
from work. The court held that coverage would not be extended since the described automobile was not withdrawn from all normal use.)
Erickson v. Genisot, 322 Mich. 303, 33 N.W.2d 803 (1948) (The insured borrowed an automobile for a 5o-mile trip because his truck was in poor condition.
The truck was used locally. The court held coverage was not extended.)
"Service Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 289 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)
(Insured's truck had a broken winch, but was otherwise in operating condition and
was used on the day insured had an accident in a substitute truck. The court held
coverage was not extended because the described vehicle was not withdrawn from
normal use.)
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from "all normal use" before a substitution will give rise to extended coverage. They reason that to hold otherwise would allow the
insured to use a substitute automobile while a member of his family
or someone with his permission used the described automobile. This
would double the insurer's risk without an appropriate increase in
33
premium.
The described automobile must be withdrawn from normal use
for one of the reasons enumerated in the temporary substitute provision before coverage will be extended to include a substitute automobile. Dispute has arisen over the meaning of some of the enumerated reasons. It has been held that there is no coverage for the insured while driving: an automobile substituted for a described automobile which has been repossessed; 34 a substitute for a described automobile which was merely low on gasoline;35 or a substitute for a described automobile upon which heavy snow chains remained. 36
Controversy has also arisen as to whether ownership of a described
automobile is a prerequisite to the operation of the substitute provision. The answer has been in the affirmative when the described
automobile has been voluntarily sold,3 7 and in the negative when
the described automobile has been sold for junk after its total destruction in an acddent. 3s The reasoning in the total destruction
cases is that the described automobile has been withdrawn from
normal use because of its destruction, and the sale was involuntary.3 9
(5)What is meant by "not owned by the named insured"? By express provision and interpretation thereof, it is established that the
insurer does not intend the temporary substitute provision to provide protection for the named insured while driving an automobile
he owns, even though it is a substitute for the described automobile
which is withdrawn from normal use.40

nSupra notes 29-31.
'Travelers Indem. Co. v. American Cas. Co., 226 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.W. Va. 1964).
2-Ransom v. Fidelity 9- Cas. Co., 25o N.C. 6o, ioS SXE.2d 22 (1959).
3'Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Addy, 132 Colo. 202, 286 P.2d 622 (1955).
arDaugaard v. Hawkeye Security Ins. Co., 239 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1956) (insured
sold the described automobile and ordered a new one); Lincombe v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 166 So. 2d 92o (La. Ct. App. 1964) (insured turned her automobile over to a dealer who had ordered a new one for her).
3McKee v. Exchange Ins. Ass'n, 270 Ala. 518, 12o So. 2d 690 (s96o); Freeport
Motor Cas. Co. v. Tharp, 338 Ill. App. 593, 88 N.E.2d 499 (1949).
3=Ibid.
"0 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 357 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1962) (Insured
gave possession of one of his two automobiles to a prospective buyer under a verbal
purchase agreement. When the automobile the insured retained became disabled he
retook possession of the other automobile and had an accident while driving it. The
court found that the named insured owned the automobile he was driving and
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Generally "named insured" is defined as the person so listed and
his spouse, if a resident of the same household. 41 Insurers apparently
assumed that this definition would exclude coverage when an automobile owned by a spouse, residing in the same household, was used as
a substitute. However, the insurers' assumption was erroneous. In
Baxley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. 42 the court reasoned
that when a husband and wife live in the same household, the definition of the "named insured" in the policy has the effect of making
the named insured two people rather than one. The court then applied the reasoning of Farley v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 43 and held
that since the wife's automobile was not owned by husband and
wife, it was not owned by the named insured, and therefore coverage existed.
Apparently in recognition of these holdings, most of the policies
issued today contain a temporary substitute provision with a slight
modification. 44 The provision reads: "not owned by the named insured
or his spouse if a resident of the same household.. .."45 The change
was apparently made to express conclusively the intent of the insurer
thus it did not qualify as a temporary substitute within the policy.); American Fid.
9- Gas. Co. v. Pennsylvania Gas. Co., 258 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1953) (similar facts as above
case); Utilities Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 207 'Okla. 574, 251 P.2d 175 (1952) (The insured
owned two trucks and bought an insurance policy for only one. While driving the
uninsured truck he was involved in an accident. The court held that coverage
was not extended by the temporary substitute clause which required that the substitute not be owned by the named insured.)
"E.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Wendler, 84 Idaho 114, 368 P.2d 933 (1962); Caldwell v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 248 Miss. 767, 16o So. 2d 20o9 (1964); Baxley v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 332, 128 S.E.2d 165 (1962).
42241 S.C. 332, 128 S.E.2d 165 (1962). The recent case of Caldwell v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co., 248 Miss. 767, 16o So. 2d 20o9 (1964), relied on the Baxley case to
reach the same result.
3137 W. Va. 455, 72 S.E.2d 520 (1954) (The insurer issued a policy to Farley and
Wallace for liability protection as to a 1950 Ford truck used in their business
partnership. The truck became disabled so a 1948 Ford truck owned by Wallace
was substituted for it. Farley had an accident while driving the substitute truck.
The temporary substitute provision indicated that a substitute vehicle must not be
owned by the named insured. The insurer denied coverage because the substitute
truck was owned by Wallace who was a named insured. The court held that Farley
and Wallace are the named insured and it would be untrue and illogical to say
a truck owned by one of them is owned by the named insured, so coverage was
extended. It is interesting to note that if Wallace had been driving the substitute
truck, which he owned, coverage, under this reasoning, would also have extended
since Farley and Wallace, and not Wallace alone, are the named insured.)
"Samples v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., lo Ga. App. 297, 138 S.E.2d 463 (1964);
Hunnicutt v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.C. 515, 122 S.E.2d 74 (i96i).
"Samples v. Georgia Mut. Ins. Co., 11o Ga. App. 297, 138 S.E.2d 463, 464
(1964).

